I. THE MILLER TEST AND ITS CRITICS
In 1957, when the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States' explicitly proclaimed that a sector of speech defined as "obscenity" fell outside of the constitutional protection of the First Amendment,' 0 it necessarily made the definition of "obscenity" a matter of constitutional law." The realm of the "obscene" became a no-man's land surrounding the fortress of the First Amendment: only speech that could defy the definition of obscenity and gain access to the First Amendment's safe walls would merit protection. Yet the determination of these boundaries proved far from clear-cut for the Supreme Court; it had set out to define what in fact "may be indefinable."' 2 The "intractable obscenity problem"' plagued the Court in the years that followed Roth. It was not until the 1966 case of Memoirs v. Massachusetts' that the Court attempted to clarify its definition, and even then it failed to produce a majority opinion.
Finally 8. This Note does not purport to argue which of these two conflicting goals-the prohibition of obscenity or the full protection of art-is more important to society. It argues only that we choose one goal at the expense of the other; we must, therefore, evaluate what we lose by choosing either alternative. Philosophers of aesthetics too numerous to mention in the context of this Note have discussed the inherent and societal values of art. [Vol. 99: 1359 definition of "obscenity" that reigns supreme to this day. For the first time in sixteen years, a majority of justices had managed to agree on a definition of a term that had "produced a variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication." 15 Yet in the shadow of the" Court's relative triumph was the disenchantment of a solid four-member dissenting minority (as well as a community of legal scholars) who had abandoned all faith in Miller's project and had grown to doubt the possibility of a constitutionally acceptable distinction between obscenity and protected spedch.
Miller v. California set forth a three-part test for determining whether a given work should be labelled "obscene":
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 6 Since it was drafted in 1973, the Court has continued to follow Miller despite persistent criticism of the test.1 7 Critics have pointed to the Court's failure to provide a workable definition of obscenity' 8 and have argued that because the standard is vague and unpredictable, it will chill speech that ought to be protected.' 9 Certain critics have focused specifically on the third prong of the test, in part because it represents a significant departure from the Court's prior obscenity holdings. Whereas both Roth and Memoirs had held that a work had to be "utterly without redeeming social value" 20 before it could be banished to the constitutional no-man's land of "obscenity," Miller rejected this expansive test in favor of a standard that protected less art and was easier for the prosecution to meet. 2 " A work of art now needed to possess "serious value" to gain protection. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent to Miller's companion case, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton:
The Court's approach necessarily assumes that some works will be deemed obscene-even though they clearly have some social value-because the State was able to prove that the value, measured by some unspecified standard, was not sufficiently "serious" to warrant constitutional protection. That result is . . . an invitation to widespread suppression of sexually oriented speech. 22 In The Pope Court, like the Miller Court, assumed that serious artistic value provided a workable standard that could distinguish sexually explicit art from obscenity. In the following section, this Note argues that this basic assumption is wrong, that serious value is no longer a coherent standard in the face of recent developments in art.
II. POST-MODERNISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MILLER
Chief Justice Burger devised the Miller test for "serious artistic value" at precisely the time that Modernism in art was in its death throes. One year earlier, the art critic Leo Steinberg had been perhaps the first to apply the name "Post-Modernism" 2 to the revolutionary artistic movement that was budding just as Miller at this turning point in art has dramatic implications, for the metamorphosis into Post-Modernism that occurred in the 1960's and early 1970's has led not to another style in art, but to an entirely transformed conception of what "art" means. 28 Attempts to define Post-Modernism ii the arts often have failed, perhaps because Post-Modernism represents not a single, clear movement, but a pluralist and many-faceted rebellion against the dictates of Modernism. 29 To begin to understand recent art, therefore, we must first consider Modernism." 0 It was a movement that began in the 1860's with the painter Manet and self-destructed-or some would say reached its apogee-in the Minimalist movement of the late 1960's.31 Yet it was a particular breed of Modernism-"late Modernism"-that became the focus of Post-Modern art. Critics and artists of the Post-Modern era universally seem to equate the Modernism against which they rebel with the formalist doctrine of Clement Greenberg, the leading critic of late Modernism, whose critical vision of art triumphed in the 1950's2
Modernism as articulated by Greenberg and his peers was a purist movement.
3 3 Greenberg believed that art could "maintain [its] past standards of excellence" ' by using the "characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself-not in order to subvert it, but to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence." 35 Late Modernism distinguished between good art and bad art 3 6 by demanding that good art be pure, selfcritical, original, sincere, 37 late Modernism. It attacked the Modernist distinctions between good art and bad, between high art and popular culture, between the sanctity of the art context and real life. Post-Modernism not only rejected the Modernist demand that art be "serious," it rejected the idea that art must have any traditional "value" at all. It mocked notions of originality and authenticity; it replaced sincerity with cynicism.
The wording of Miller clearly reflects the Modernist era in which it was drafted. As an art critic wrote of Modernism, "the highest accolade that could be paid to any artist was this: 'serious.' '38 It is as if the word "serious" were a codeword for Modernist values: critics consistently equate it with the Modernist stance. 9 In fact, the very foundation of Miller, the belief that some art is just not good enough or serious enough to be worthy of protection, mirrors the Modernist notion that distinctions could be drawn between good art and bad, and that the value of art was objectively verifiable. 4 " Thus Miller has etched in stone a theory of art that was itself a product of only a transitory phase in art history-the period of late Modernism.
Miller, however, has not suddenly become a dangerous standard only now that Post-Modern art has become the dominant mood of the era. Coexisting with the Modernist movement itself were ideas which strained the measure of "serious artistic value." In order to realize his pure ideology, Greenberg, the leading late Modernist critic, had been forced to ignore an important twentieth-century counter-tradition to Modernism that preceded Post-Modernism: Dadaism (exemplified in the work of Marcel Duchamp), Surrealism, and later, Pop. 4 
A. Themes of Post -Modernism and Their Implications for Miller
What did the Miller Court mean by "serious artistic value"?"" There are at least three plausible interpretations: (1) the artwork makes an important and original rather than a marginal and derivative contribution to art; 45 (2) the artwork is "serious" in that it reflects the sanctity and solemnity of high art; 41 (3) the artist was serious and sincere in his attempt to make art (rather than obscenity), no matter how successful his ultimate achievement. 47 This subsection tests each of these three interpretations of serious value against examples of Post-Modern art. 4 " Ultimately, each will prove inadequate when thus applied because each rests on assumptions which Post-Modernism rejects. 43 . Se" L. STEINBERG, supra note 27, at 91 (Post-Modernism has left "old stand-by criteria" for evaluating art "to rule an eroding plain"). Of course, it is still true in the Post-Modern era that individual critics and schools of criticism have certain standards by which they evaluate art. I simply mean that there is no longer a universally agreed upon standard, as there was in the days that Clement Greenberg's ideology dominated late Modernism. This reflects the Post-Modern tendency to undermine and reject the Modernist assumption (based on Kantian notions of aesthetics) that there can be universal judgments of taste. 48. I do not mean to suggest that the three themes of Post-Modernism discussed below represent a thorough account of the major principles of this anarchic movement. They are simply the aspects of Post-Modernism that are most relevant for an assessment of Miller, but hardly an exhaustive characterization of Post-Modernism.
The End of Originality and the Avant Garde "No new tale to tell" -Love and Rockets' 4
One of the major hallmarks of Post-Modernism is its rejection of the Modernist quest to be new, original, and avant-garde. 5 0 Post-Modern art is aggressively derivative. As the art critic Brian Wallis wrote, "Today no action, no feeling, no thought we own has not been performed by a thousand movies, commercials, television sitcoms, or magazine articles. Our society, supersaturated with information and images, not only has no need for individuality, it no longer owns such a concept." 6 '
Consider the appropriation artist Sherrie Levine. In the early 1980's Levine's art consisted of taking famous art photographs and simply rephotographing them as a means of deconstructing the Modernist belief in originality. 2 Or take as an example the painter David Salle, who layers and juxtaposes images that he appropriates from art history as well as from popular culture-pornography, fashion illustrations, and cartoons-in order to show the impossibility of originality in the PostModern era. By joining unconnected images, Salle invites the viewer to search for a narrative in his paintings, yet none exists." Rather, Salle seeks to show the muteness and futility of his images in the wake of Modernism and its emphasis on originality. A critic has called Salle's paintings "dead, inert representations of the impossibility of passion in a culture that has institutionalized self-expression." '54 Salle says his paintings are about "all the paintings I won't make or can't make. .. . " The Miller test presupposes a theory of art which Salle and Levine reject. As Harry Kalven wrote of Miller: "It is of course unlikely that Ulysses will again be banned, but there is a danger under the new test that a second-rate Ulysses which the Court does not regard as sufficiently 'serious' will be." '56 The problem is that in Post-Modern art, the next Ulysses is likely to be a work that is precisely about its own "secondrateness." This is the thrust of Levine's and Salle's art: all they have left to them is to recycle images, whether from high art or from low culture, because it has all been done before. Modernism, which equated a first- rate or serious painting with originality, 5 " is over. By celebrating their derivativeness, artists like these attack one of the basic standards that established the value of Modernist art. Thus if we interpret "serious value" to mean that a work of art makes a significant rather than a marginal contribution to art, this standard would fail to protect many Post-Modern artists. If a Levine photograph of another artist's photograph makes an important contribution to art, it is only because her work is on some level about her inability to make an important contribution to art.
Defiance of Serious Artistic Value [T]he 80's has been the decade in which art that denies the value of art has become the most valuable art around. 8
A second possible meaning for "serious value" may be that the work of art reflects the sanctity and solemnity of high art, as opposed to mass culture. But one of the essential tenets of Modernism that PostModernism attacks is the canonical distinction between high art and popular culture. 59 Thus a critic wrote in 1975 that Andy Warhol had "liquidated the century-old [Modernist] tension between the serious artist and the majority culture." 6 Post-Modern artists reject the solemnity associated with late Modernism by incorporating images of kitsch, humor, entertainment, and media into their work. 6 For example, the artist Julie Wachtel traces cartoon figures from cheap greeting cards directly onto canvas. Her paintings reject "not just the idea of originality but the idea of Quality." 2 Is "serious value" an appropriate standard by which to judge these works? Wachtel mocks notions of value. Her images are whimsical and lowly; her message is that even a cheap card is art.
Artist Jeff Koons' work looks like tacky lawn sculpture. For one of his most recent designs, Koons hired highly skilled Italian artisans to create a porcelain porn star in the arms of the Pink Panther. As an art critic wrote of Koons In fact, Post-Modern art does not merely reject the serious value standard; it defies any standard used to judge it. For example, the late 1970's movement called "Bad Painting" rebelled against Modernist distinctions between good art and bad art by employing tasteless images, inept drawing, poor craftsmanship, and" unschooled color. 6 This kind of art mocks anyone who attempts to determine its "value." Its aim is to ridicule the notion that we can distinguish between works of "serious value" and bad art. In fact, it challenges the possibility of any critical standard.
The Death of the Artist: Sincerity and Intent
Finally, "serious value" might be read as an inquiry into the artist's intentions rather than a judgment about the work's value. The question becomes "did the artist sincerely intend to create art?" In those rare instances when serious value is discussed at all by courts and critics, this is the favored interpretation of the term. 5 But this interpretation also proves troublesome when applied to recent art because Post-Modernism regards notions of intentionality and sincerity as naive Modernist constructs. 68 Rather than allowing the viewer to rely on these former guideposts, PostModern art often pressures the viewer to consider the absence of the artist, and the presence of multiple possibilities of interpretation which arise when the artist's intent becomes unknowable. 7 For example, David Salle's strategy of painting in several different styles within the same painting raises numerous interpretive possibilities and makes us question whether or not the painter is sincere, throwing into doubt the Modernist assumption that an artist's style and gesture are his signature, the guarantor of his sincerity and authenticity. 68 Salle presents sincerity as just another pose. Is Wachtel's tracing of a cheap greeting card really a sincere effort to make art, or a mockery of art? As a painter in the Bad Painting movement said, "There is only bad art because there is no such thing as art."69 Can we say that his paintings are therefore Freud was obviously a central influence on these theories. At the risk of oversimplifying, Freudian notions of the unconscious lead inevitably to the idea that even an artist himself may be unaware of his "true" intentions. earnest attempts to create art? Terms such as "sincere" and "earnest" are as inappropriate to describe contemporary art as "serious" is. How can we use such standards to evaluate the deeply cynical and jaded art that has arisen in the Post-Modern era? 70 
B. The Intersection of Art and Obscenity
The most pressing challenge to the Miller test comes from a sector of Post-Modern artists who not only defy standards like serious value, but also attack the most basic premise of Miller: that art can be distinguished from obscenity. Some of the artists described in the following section of this Note are extremely-and deliberately-shocking and offensive. It may be hard to understand the value that critics find in this kind of work. Yet it is precisely because these works are so hard for many people to see as "art" that they are of pressing importance for the legal community to consider. The art I will describe below illustrates the chasm that has formed between contemporary artistic practice and legal theories of art-theories like Miller, which purport to distinguish art from obscenity by relying on such standards as "serious artistic value."
An important and established artist to consider is Karen Finley, whose performance art has been called "obscenity in its purest form." She is indeed a shocking performer. She smears food into her genitals and has even defecated onstage; in her performances she graphically describes violent and bizarre sex acts with priests, children, relatives, and the handicapped. Annie Sprinkle is another performance artist whose work challenges the distinction between art and obscenity. Sprinkle works in the pornography industry, appearing in magazines and X-rated movies; yet she also performs in art settings, and elements from the two worlds commingle in her work. For example, she appeared in 1988 at the Kitchen Center for the Performing Arts' 73 "Carnival of Sleaze" Festival. There she gave a performance that included elements from another performance she had given 70 . In spite of all of these considerations, surely there exists contemporary art that is "original," or solemn, or deadly sincere. Nowhere is this more evident than in the highly political art that has arisen in response to AIDS. See, e.g., AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/ CULTURAL ACTIvIsM (D. Crimp ed. 1989). Nonetheless, the critique of sincerity and intentionality remains central to a great deal of Post-Modern art; to judge art based on an artist's constructive intent would be to impose on it a standard that contemporary art as a movement resoundingly rejects. One might argue further, however, that even art which criticizes notions of sincerity may nonetheless be sincere. "Aren't these artists serious about deriding seriousness?" the argument might go. Yet how could a court or a jury distinguish an artist who is "serious" about rejecting seriousness from one who does so with irreverence or cynicism about his very project? In the end, this question returns us to the naive question with which we began and which Finally, we may consider the work of the late Robert Mapplethorpe, whose classicized, elegant photographs often take as their subject graphically sexual portraits of men in homoerotic or sadomasochistic positions, and whose work recently became the center of a raging controversy. 80 In the summer of 1989, in a startling yet prescient act of self-censorship, the Corcoran Gallery of Art cancelled-at the last minute, after all the invitations had gone out-a Mapplethorpe exhibition. Brandishing Mapplethorpe's virtuosic and frankly sexual pictures before Congress, Senator Jesse Helms seized the moment. Although they defeated Helms' more radical proposal, an outraged Congress nonetheless decided to eliminate Federal funding for any sexually explicit art that fails Miller's "serious value" test."' These artists have so far escaped obscenity prosecutions, yet the Mapplethorpe controversy bears ominous witness to the anger and misunderstanding surrounding sexually explicit Post-Modern art. The climate is ripe for censorship. Not only Mapplethorpe has fallen prey. Police have stormed some of Finley's performances; 2 worried gallery and club owners routinely cancel her engagements. 8 3 She has been completely banned in 74 . Telephone interview with Patrick Moore, Publicity Director, the Kitchen Center for the Performing Arts (Nov. 21, 1988) .
75. Id. But Sprinkle told me that although she mixes elements of pornography and art in all her work, she feels there is a distinction between the two different modes; as she sees it, art provides more room than pornography for looking at her subject "from lots of different perspectives." Telephone interview with Annie Sprinkle (Feb. 26, 1990 the film was not patently offensive. 4 But these standards would offer no protection to Finley or Kern. Their work would find protection only under the serious value prong of the test, and that prong, as this Note has argued, offers little protection to Post-Modern art. Here is where the real danger of the Miller test emerges, for its wording does not even contemplate the possibility that this kind of art exists.
Perhaps, though, in spite of all these difficulties, the standard of "serious artistic value" is nonetheless workable: if an artist like Finley were challenged under Miller, she would certainly be able to find art critics to testify that her work is art. 95 But critical acclaim would not guarantee such an artist protection under Miller as interpreted in Pope v. Illinois. 96 In fact, the reasonable person standard called for in Pope appears to heighten rather than mitigate the dangers of Miller for sexually explicit Post-Modern artists.
Justice Stevens' dissent in Pope pointed out the threat this test poses for unpopular or misunderstood art. The new standard, he argued, will provide room for juries to disregard the testimony of experts such as art critics; a juror might conclude that the experts represent an unreasonable minority, and that the majority of the population, who are less likely to see the work as valuable, are more reasonable than the critics." This leeway for the jury to disregard expert testimony is extremely dangerous for artists like Finley, Sprinkle, Mapplethorpe, and Kern; because their work might appear shocking and remains far removed from lay notions of art, the majority of the population probably would not consider this work to be art. Only expert testimony could save these artists in an obscenity proceeding. 95. Of course, an undiscovered artist whose work represents a departure from current artistic practice might not be able to find critics to testify that his work is art. would think Mapplethorpe is even an artist, let alone that his art is of serious value. Pope is an extremely dangerous standard. 1 0 Why should we care at all about First Amendment protection for these artists? The reader may think that if this is the state to which "art" has degenerated, or if only this sensationalism masquerading as art is at stake, then we suffer no great loss if obscenity doctrine does not protect this work. Yet the reader's resistance to understanding why this work should be called "art"-indeed, the reader's possible revulsion-is exactly the point: it illustrates the dramatic clash between lay notions of art and actual artistic practice. This portion of the Note justifies protection for the artists described above, but only based on the assumption that we as a society should extend First Amendment protection to "art" in general.
(Whether or not that is a valid assumption is a question that exceeds the scope of this Note.)' 0 '
As an art critic wrote of works like Finley's and Sprinkle's: "Understandably, to audiences habituated to the traditional boundaries of art, to audiences for whom easel painting was still the quintessential art activity, these performances were offensive and even insulting. . . . But [these works] have been part of. . . art. . . legitimized by. . . critical designation again and again. ' 12 Scholars and artists do care about these works. Although Robert Mapplethorpe is perhaps the most well-known of the artists described above (and this is certainly true now that Jesse Helms has made him a household name, the enfant terrible of the art world), all of these artists have won critical attention. For example, writers have noted Karen Finley's "disturbing power"°3 and transfixing performances; many see her work as a powerfully subversive reading of female degradation in American society.' 0 4
Furthermore, Miller poses problems for more artists than the few I have described above. Any Post-Modern artist who uses sexually explicit material could be at risk under Miller, and the potential chilling effect is incalculable. As Karen Finley commented, "There are artists right now who are changing their art because they are scared."' 0 5 This phenomenon is particularly troubling because sexual imagery is crucial to many PostModern artworks. The censorship of sexual images has already threatened, for example, the growing body of political art about AIDS; 0 . ' Just as pornography operates on a system of seduction (inviting the viewer to look at sexually provocative images) and frustration (you can look but you can't touch),' 0 9 Salle's juxtaposed images seduce the viewer into searching for a narrative, for some explanation of their linkage, yet deny the viewer any gratification; Salle has declared that no narrative exists. He promises a revelation and delivers nothing. Thus Salle uses the language of pornography to deconstruct the language of representation itself, drawing on the way pornography tantalizes and cheats the viewer in order to underscore the failure of the signifier in his own work. To rid his paintings of their sexual imagery would be to rob them of their power." 0 Ultimately, this kind of art raises the question: should courts be the judges of artistic merit? As Justice Holmes wrote in 1903:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time."' by others."' 12 Indeed, the history of art includes many examples of sexually explicit art works that society denounced as shocking and repulsive only later to deem them masterpieces." 3 For example, the great Manet painting, Le Dejeuner sur 1'herbe, caused a venomous uproar in 1863 when it was first shown because of its casual depiction of nudity coupled with its then-radical paint style.' 1 4 Even before the Post-Modern revolt in the arts, courts have long recognized that they are not proper arbiters of artistic worth. As Justice Douglas wrote: "We are judges, not literary experts . . . We are not competent to render an independent judgment as to the worth of this or any other book . . Given that "serious artistic value" has become an obsolete standard in light of the art that has developed since Miller was decided in 1973, what should replace it? Is there a better standard which courts could use in order to distinguish "art" from obscenity? The answer to this question hinges on how we choose to define art. Rather than embarking on an exhaustive inquiry into the philosophical question "what is art?," this Note instead examines practical ways in which courts in obscenity cases might be able to determine if a work in dispute were art. This section considers, and ultimately rejects, three possible standards that courts might turn to for defining art.
A.

Is Art Defined by the Artist's Intentions?
The idea grew up in the 1960's that anything an artist designates as art becomes art." 7 This notion was exemplified in an anecdote about the painter Robert Rauschenberg. In response to a commission to do a portrait for a group gallery show, Rauschenberg sent not a painting but a telegram reading "This is a portrait . . . if I say so." ' 
'
The gallery displayed the telegram on the wall with all the other "portraits." The distinction between art and non-art in examples like this lies solely in the artist's intention.
Nonetheless, a definition of art that relied on this standard would prove unworkable for the courts for two reasons. First, if a court were to accept that "this is a portrait if I say so," then there would be nothing to prevent a hard-core pornographer from raising the defense that he intended his pornography to be art. Secondly, Post-Modern art would render a deeper inquiry into the purported artist's sincerity futile, because, as discussed earlier, i " 9 Post-Modernism ridicules the notion of sincerity and rejects the possibility that a viewer can ever discover an artist's true intentions. Thus, because of the very nature of Post-Modern art, this deeper inquiry would fail. This standard certainly would protect more art than Miller does, but it would do so by eschewing any principled controls on the proliferation of obscenity. In fact, the standard does not even offer a way to guarantee artistic freedom because it would fail to account for a major theme of Post-Modern art: the rejection of sincerity.
B. Does Art World Acceptance Define Art?
Perhaps a definition of art could be as simple as this: if it's hanging in the Museum of Modern Art (or in any art context), it's art.
1 20 Although this standard would obviously protect a great deal of art, it would also leave a great deal of art unprotected; video, performance art, and graffiti art, for example, do not depend on an art context for their current status as art in the eyes of the art world.
Another way to tackle the question would be to ask if the purported art work directs itself to an art audience.' 2 ' But this standard poses problems as well. For example, Karen Finley often performs before "drunken, rowdy" crowds in nightclubs.' 2 2 Annie Sprinkle has followers in both the art and pornography worlds.' 2 3
Could courts defer to critics, scholars, and museums to decide what art is? This standard would not protect undiscovered artists, developing artists, unpopular artists, or artists who are "ahead of their time." Examples abound of artists in the current canon who were unrecognized or repudiated in their day.' 2 4 As the Court in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.* noted, "What is good literature, . . . what is good art, varies with individuals as it does from one generation to another."' 25 Relying solely on critical acceptance to define art will inevitably chill the work of unpopular and unrecognized artists, the very people who may be most likely to change the course of art. 26 As the Court has noted in its First Amendment decisions, it is essential to protect speech from the "prevailing climate of opinion. ) 127 Courts could not achieve that goal if they were to rely on the prevailing climate of the art world as the sole indicator of whether or not a work were art. Although this standard would protect more artists than Miller does, it nonetheless would threaten to freeze the status quo in art, sacrificing an entire sector of artistic expression.
C.
Would a Trier of Fact Know Art When He Sees It?
Art, like obscenity, may be difficult to define, but does that mean that a judge will not be able to recognize it? Will a court or a jury simply "know it when they see it"? 128 With Post-Modern art, the answer is no. Because because of its appeal to "deviant" sexual group).
122. Carr, supra note 72.
123. This kind of art also defeats the distinction that Professor Schauer draws between hard-core pornography and art. See Schauer, supra note 47, at 922-23. Schauer argues that pornography acts as a sexual surrogate for the viewer, affecting him only physically, whereas art and other protected speech appeal to the "intellectual process." Yet Mapplethorpe's work, for example, challenges this distinction. For some viewers, the erotic content of Mapplethorpe photographs may constitute their main appeal. Furthermore, Schauer does not account for the long tradition of eroticism in art, in which sexual arousal is art's primary-perhaps exclusive-goal. See (1957) . 128. This is, of course, a reference to Justice Stewart's famous remark on hard-core pornography, "I know it when I see it," in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). many contemporary artists are so estranged from lay notions of what constitutes "art," courts might refuse to recognize them as artists in spite of wide critical acceptance by the art community. This standard goes to the heart of the problem of defining Post-Modern art: its rebellion against traditional notions of the essential nature of art. The standard would protect less art than Miller and thus appears to offer no solution.
The real problem with devising a standard by which to evaluate PostModern art derives from the nature of Post-Modernism, a rebellious movement that attacks any standard used to judge it. The very proposal of any one standard would defeat the thrust of this Note: that "art" in its recent incarnation violates any definition we give it. The standards discussed above provide alternatives to Miller, yet none of them offers a satisfactory test. As long as we proscribe any pocket of sexually explicit speech, we will endanger some spectrum of artistic speech as well. Although the first two standards would protect some (and perhaps most) sexually explicit Post-Modern art, and while they both would protect more contemporary art than the Miller test does, each of these alternative standards would also leave some art unprotected. And this unprotected art might be the art we most care to protect: daring or iconoclastic works that would further challenge our notions of what art is.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many have written about the failure of the Miller Court to provide a principled definition of "obscenity." The intense difficulty of this task has generated tremendous disagreement among the members of the Court; it is the very difficulty that led Justice Brennan, the chief architect of Roth, to abandon after sixteen years any attempt to define obscenity, to argue that we should no longer try to exclude obscene speech from the protection of the First Amendment. "Obscenity" is not the only term in Miller that is difficult to define. "Art," one of the very areas of speech the Miller Court attempted to protect, proves equally elusive. "Art," by its nature, will call into question any definition that we ascribe to it. As soon as we put up a boundary, an artist will violate it, because that is what artists do. In the end, we as a society are left with a choice: either we protect art as a whole or we protect ourselves from obscenity. But we choose one at the sacrifice of the other. It is impossible to do both.*
